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Appendix 
In this appendix we show that the optimal degree of profit sharing in the 
backward contract is on the interval (0,1]. We do this in two parts. We first 
show the optimal contractual share to be non-negative. Assume the share is 
not positive. From expression (14), a* < 0 implies: 
c-Pfi'-P'fD'fD<P'fF'fi fâcA 
\3CD / 
Rearranging terms, we can express this result as: 
CKPfi'+P'fi'fi+P'ß'fi, (AA 
dxo 
= / " 
\UXD J 
where the right-hand equality holds by the downstream first-order condition 
(13). 
The non-positive profit-share contradicts the optimal price set in the 
upstage industry, however, as c > PU by expression (12). Therefore, non-
positive market-share contracts contradict, whence the market-share of an 
upstream producer is positive. 
We next show the optimal contractual share to be consistent with values 
less than one. From expression (15), a contractual share less than unitary 
value implies: 
c-Pfo'-Ffi'fiKlFff'ß fâcA 
\acoj 
or, using downstream first-order condition (16), that: 
\AB) 
(Al) 
The claim holds for any a by inspection, since all values of a < I that satisfy the 
upstream optimality condition (12), c-PiJ =aFff'fo 
(Al). 
a> \ 
CX'n J 
, also satisfy conditio11 
Q.E.D. 
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1 Introduction 
Bottlenecks in the food chain can result from shortcomings in market 
transparency and in the capacity or willingness to adapt to market changes. 
Shortcomings in market transparency may originate from poor exchange of 
market information and from limited transfer of changes in prices through the 
channel. 
This paper is concerned with bottlenecks in the coordination of marketing 
Policies in the channel of agricultural and food products. We focus on price 
coordination. This subject has been fundamentally discussed in the industrial 
economics theory (e.g. Tirole, 1988; Martin, 1993). The relationship between 
farm prices and consumer food prices has been extensively investigated in the 
vast literature on marketing margins (Berck and Rauser, 1982; Briz and De 
Felipe, 1997). 
This paper tackles a specific topic in this field. It tries to develop a 
Method for monitoring the quality of price coordination in agricultural 
Marketing channels. Such methods seem indispensible for finding 
shortcomings in channel performance. 
Hie paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a conceptual framework 
0 r
 P"ce relationships in food marketing channels is developed. In Section 3 
Rector error-correction modelling is proposed as a measurement instrument 
,
0 r
 Monitoring price coordination in the food chain. In Section 4 this 
Instrument is applied to the pork production-marketing chain in the 
etherlands. In Section 5 the main conclusions are summarized and 
actions for further research are proposed. 
2
 Stiels 
Pr
'ce coordination in marketing channels is concerned with relating 
Product prices at various stages of the marketing channel in such a way that 
UnivPa"mcm ° f M a r k c l i n£ a n d Marketing Research, Wageningen Agricultural 
ersiiy, Wagonineen, 'I he Netherlands. 
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the channel is performing well. It implies that product price changes at a 
particular stage of the channel, ceteris paribus, influence prices in other 
stages of the marketing channel. The correlation between prices at the 
different stages of the marketing channel seems an important indicator of 
price coordination or bottlenecks in marketing channels, but does not tell the 
whole story. In fact, price coordination in the channel depends on the price 
strategy of the respective channel companies. Therefore, monitoring a 
marketing channel for price bottlenecks might profit from a conceptual 
framework of companies' price strategy vis a vis changing purchase prices. 
We suggest the following hierarchy in price coordination as a framework for 
monitoring bottlenecks in pricing. As a matter of convenience, we assume in 
our presentation a three-level marketing channel, e.g. producer, wholesaler 
and retailer, referred to as companies 1, 2 and 3 respectively, but our results 
can be generalized to a p-level channel. 
" "Ad hoc "price coordination ", price changes are coordinated only in case 
of substantial price changes. 
In this situation companies fix their price without considering "modest" 
price changes by other companies in the channel: 
Pi =PI ,5 + «I» (la) 
Ui = #(0,0,2), (lb) 
where/?/ is the selling price of company i (i = 1,2,3), pitS is the structural 
price of company i and ut is a random term. 
Companies have a price, pis, in mind which they consider to be 
appropriate in view of the structural demand. Actual prices deviate from that 
price only by a random term. Company ƒ does not change its selling price pi 
vis a vis changes in the purchase price p M . This case of absent price 
coordination in the channel seems relevant only in stationary markets or 
when the price pt.\ is a minor part of total costs per unit of company /, for 
example, in case of substantial processing of agricultural products. However, 
in dynamic markets purchase prices might change substantially and 
companies might use the additional criterion: 
Pi-Pi-\ >miy (lc) 
where m,- is the necessary contribution of pt to variable costs and overhead 
per unit of product. In case of substantial price changes this condition will 
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often not be fulfilled and company / may now change its selling price in 
response to changes in the purchase price. 
"Routinized price coordination ", systematic price coordination by companies 
in the channel on the basis of a routine procedure. 
Two situations can be distinguished: 
a) Companies apply the same "markup" as a routine procedure; 
b) "Follow the leader" as a price coordination procedure. 
a) 
Company / in the channel is using a specific markup as a routine procedure: 
Pi=APi-l>*i) » (2a) 
where JC/ are other price-influencing factors. This routine procedure, for 
example pi - ao +aip/-i or pi =ap/.i, may have an economic basis, but 
cannot always considered to be a rational, optimizing procedure. In markets 
with frequent, e.g. daily, price changes, transaction costs of economically 
effective pricing per transaction might be too high. For that reason, 
companies use a routine procedure, which has proven to be economically 
viable. Such a procedure may be practised, for instance, by wholesalers and 
retailers in marketing channels of fresh produce. 
b) 
Companies adapt prices to changes in prices of the channel leader: 
Pi =f(Pcbxi) . 0) 
where pc\ is the price of the channel leader. For instance, in consumer-
oriented marketing channels big retailers or food industries may initiate a 
price change if consumer demand is decreasing or increasing. Other 
companies in the channel will follow. 
'Rational price coordination " coordination of channel prices aiming at 
profit maximization. 
Also here two models can be distinguished: 
a) partially rational price coordination; 
b) fully rational price coordination. 
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a) 
Individual companies in the channel, but not the channel as a whole, adapt 
prices to changes in purchase prices in order to maximize profit: 
Max 77/ = {pi - ci - pi. i )q , (4a) 
subject to 
lnp3 = (1/Sp)lnq +s, (8p <-l) (4b) 
where Ui is the profit of company i, q is the product flow through the 
channel and C( are the costs per unit faced by company i. The inverse demand 
equation (4b) is assumed to be log-linear so the price elasticity of demand, 
ôp, is constant, s captures exogenous demand shifts. 773 will be maximized if: 
dU^fdq =P3 + q(dp3/dq) -c3-p2 = Q, (4c) 
leading to the following price equilibrium: 
P3 = (P2 + C3)Sp/(l + Sp). (4d) 
Subject to (4d) the first-order condition with respect to maximization of 
172 gives 
P2 =PiSp/(l +fy+ (Spc2 -C3)/(l + Sp), (4e) 
and finally, reminding that I7\=(p\- c\)q, maximization of I7\ determines/^: 
From (4f) and (4b) q can be derived. 
b) 
The companies determine jointly the price of the final channel product such 
that profits are maximized. This implies: 
Max/7C = (/7C-X ,.,^^> (5a) 
subject to 
\npc = (\lhp)\nq + s, (8p<-l) (5b) 
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where FIC is the profit of the whole channel and pc is the price of the final 
channel product. The first-order condition of the profit maximization problem 
is: 
ânjaI = pc+q(^c/aI)-Yélcl=oJ (5c) 
giving 
* = L > . V < I + * , ) - (5d> 
Because Sp < -1, comparing (4f) with (5d) shows that/?c <p$ and hence, q 
wiU be greater at p c than atj?3 and so ITC will be greater than TJ\ + FIj + / ^ of 
the partially rational price coordination model. 
Equilibrium price relationships can be derived e.g. by assuming that 
companies 1 and 2 charge a two-part tariff (Tirole, 1988: 176): 
A? = 4 +E',.ici?- (5e) 
From (5a) it follows that 
P c = ^ / ? + Z > , . (50 
So
 company 2 charges company 3 
p2 = a2/7c/g + c, +c2 =a2(/?c - 2 - i c > ) + ci + c* » (5g) 
w
^h 0 < a.2 < 1, and, in turn, company 1 charges company 2 
pi = a\a2l7c/q + cj = cq(p2 - n - Q ) + c\ , (5h) 
with 0 < ai < 1. From (5g) and (5h) it can be seen that company 2 takes 012 
Part of Uc away from company 3, while company 1 takes a.\ part of a2I7c 
away from company 2. The companies have to agree upon feasible values of 
a i and a2. 
The proposed hierarchy from ""adhoc"price coordination", "routinized 
price coordination " to "rational price coordination " suggests that the more 
rattonal companies are, the more price coordination is grounded on economic 
»actors such as costs and price elasticity of demand. Nevertheless, all models 
Suggest quite the same bivariate equilibrium (i.e., static) price relationships, 
fherefore, in addition to studying the static price relationships, as e.g. in 
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Larue (1991), we must also consider short-run price dynamics that shows 
how these equilibrium price relationships are affected and reestablished after 
a price shock (innovation) occurs in one of the channel stages. In the next 
sections this investigation will be carried out by vector error-correction 
modelling and applied to the Dutch pork production-marketing chain. 
3 Method 
Let Xt - (pih'-jPptï be a vector of p prices, where p-lt (i = l,...,p) is the 
output price of stage / in the marketing channel and p > 2 is the total number 
of stages in the marketing channel in which stage 1 is upstream and stage/? is 
downstream. Given that % is integrated of order zero (i.e., stationary), 
denoted 7(0), while the prices, like many economic variables, are integrated 
of order one (i.e., nonstationary), denoted /(l), see e.g. Hamilton (1994), all 
models in Section 2 imply p - 1 bivariate long-run equilibrium price 
relationships as follows: 
Pu =ßoj-i + ßu-i Pi-u +eit, (6) 
where / = 2,...,p, the ßs are parameters and e^ is 1(0) representing the short-
run deviations from the equilibrium. A multivariate time series model must 
be used to find evidence of (6) and to show how prices respond if one of them 
causes a disequilibrium. In this study we employ Johansens's maximum 
likelihood (ML) procedure (Johansen, 1988, 1991 and 1995b; Johansen and 
Juselius, 1990, 1994) for estimation of a vector error-correction model 
(VECM) of the prices. 
Starting point of the Johansen procedure is a vector autoregressive model 
of order k, denoted VAR(k), that can be rewritten as 
AX^m^+Yl^rAX^ -,M + 0D,^s, , (7) 
where AY, = Xt - Xt.\, \i are the intercepts, Dt are centred seasonal dummies 
which sum to zero over a full year, 8i,...,Ef are IINp(09A) and X J B - I , . . . ^ are 
fixed. Suppose that Xt is 1(1), then the coefficient matrix n contains 
information about the long-run price relationships. If rank(FI) = r with 0 < r < 
/?, then there are r long-run (i.e., cointegration) relationships and FI can be 
expressed as the outer product of two (full column rank) (p x r) matrices a 
and ß: 
n=aßf, (8) 
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such that $Xt is 7(0) in which case (7) is called a VECM. The columns of ß 
are called the cointegrating vectors and can be identified by imposing 
restrictions as follows: 
ß = (Htf,,..., Hrfa), (9) 
where Hj (ƒ = l,...,r) is a (pxsß matrix reducing thep-dimensional vector ßy to 
the sy-dimensional vector ty with 2 < sj < p. The system is checked for 
identification using the rank condition in Johansen (1995a) and the ML 
estimates of a and ß are computed by the switching algorithm outlined in 
Johansen and Juselius (1994). 
If prices are coordinated such that there are p - 1 cointegrating vectors, 
then none of the stages act as bottlenecks in long-run price coordination. 
Moreover, if the /th row of a is zero, i.e., pa is weakly exogenous for ß 
(Johansen, 1992a,b), then, following Hall and Milne's (1994) definition of 
long-run causality, stage / is the channel price leader. There are no channel 
price leaders if a does not contain zero rows. 
A stage will be considered a bottleneck in short-run price coordination if 
its price does not transfer price changes in the chain. These bottlenecks can 
be traced by estimating (7) under the restrictions (8) and (9), and using this 
estimated model, while abstracting from Dh to simulate the prices after one 
Price has broken the equilibrium. 
An empirical application is presented in the next section. 
4 Application 
We consider the marketing channel of pork in the Netherlands, see, for 
Sample, Den Ouden et al. (1996). Four stages are distinguished (p = 4): the 
breeders (stage 1), who produce the piglets; the fatteners (stage 2), who 
Produce the fattened pigs; the slaughterhouses (stage 3), which produce the 
P°rk; and lastly, the retailers (stage 4), who sell the pork to the consumers. 
Consequently, the dataset contains the piglet price, p\ (Dfl/piglet), the price 
°f fattened pigs,/?2 (Dfl/100kg), the price index of pork at the slaughterhouse 
,eyel,P3 (1985 = 100), and the retail price index of pork, p4 (1985 = 100). All 
prices are deflated by the Dutch consumer price index (1985 = 1.00). Our 
sample consists of monthly data from January 1989 up to and including May 
1994 (65 observations). The data and their sources are available from the 
authors upon request. 
First, the order of the VAR, k, is determined as well as the number of 
integrating vectors, r, see Table 1. Four information criteria are computed: 
F pE, AIC, HQ and SC, see Lütkepohl (1991). The estimate for k is chosen 
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such that the criterion is minimized. FPE and AIC select k = 2, while HQ and 
SC estimate k = 1. However, at k = 1 the likelihood ratio test testing 16 
restrictions, denoted LR(16), rejects VAR(l) against VAR(2) at the 10% 
level. Moreover, a VAR(2) complies with p - 1 = 3 cointegrating vectors as 
selected by Johansen's trace statistic (see Table 2), where we use those 90% 
quantiles, denoted trace(90%), that comply with the result that the LR(1) test 
(see Table 1) does not reject the restriction according to which /J is only 
included in the cointegrating space (for the LR test concerning (i, see 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990; the critical values are obtained from Table 1* in 
Osterwald-Lenum, 1992: 467). Based on these results we tentatively 
conclude that k = 2 and r = 3. 
Table 1. VAR order determination 
k 0 
FPE 3802 
AIC 6.53 
HQ 6.53 
SC 6.53 
p-valueLR(16) 0.00 
r 
/7-value LR( 1 ) 
1 
34.64 
1.80 
2.02 
2.37 
0.07 
2 
0.79 
2 
33.11 
1.69 
2.14 
2.84 
0.65 
3 
0.96 
Table 2. Cointegrating rank determination (k = 
r 0 
trace 71.93 
trace(90%) 49.65 
1 
39.01 
32.00 
3 
42.74 
1.85 
2.52 
3.57 
0.92 
1 
0.54 
•2) 
2 
19.42 
17.85 
4 
64.13 
2.11 
3.00 
4.40 
0.99 
0 
0.67 
5 
115.44 
2.48 
3.59 
5.52 
0.21 
0 
0.47 
3 
3.77 
7.52 
The r = p - 1 - 3 result is in line with the price coordination models 
discussed in Section 2. After normalization, the estimated cointegrating 
vectors lead to the following long-run equilibrium price relationships (t-
values in parentheses are asymptotically i¥(0,l) distributed): 
P2/=55.98 + 2.13pi, + é2/, (10a) 
(4 64) (10 21) 
/>3,= 15.68+ 0.19p2/ + ê3/, (10b) 
(16.02) (35.33) 
P4t= 3.85 + 0.05p3, + ê4i. (10c) 
(12 95) (20 20) 
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All cointegrating parameter estimates are highly significant and have the 
correct sign. Hence, as far as this limited evidence goes, we conclude that 
there are no bottlenecks in long-run price coordination. 
To investigate the short-run dynamics, the response to a one-time one-
standard deviation shock (i.e., impulse) in one of the prices is computed. 
Following the observed chronology in the pork production-marketing chain, 
the Apa variable(s) is (are) added to the ApJt equation of the VECM (/' = I,... J 
- 1 for each j = 2, 3, 4) (cf. Sanjuan et al., 1997). This extension, which, in 
fact, proposes a (recursive) structural VECM (Hamilton, 1994: 324-340), is 
necessary in order to avoid misleading results emerging from erroneously 
Snoring the contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances of the 
VECM. Tables 3-6 show how the prices respond to an impulse in/?/ in, say, 
nionth 0. The responses are computed in terms of deviations (%) from the 
e
^uilibium values in month -1. Responses marked with an "*" are significant 
when using a 95% confidence interval. 
In Tables 3 and 6 the effect of the impulse to the system appears to be 
permanent and as predicted by the long-run structure (lOa)-(lOc), all prices 
change in the same direction to reach their new equilibrium values, which are 
higher than the old ones in case of an impulse in p\ and lower after an 
'tnpulse in p^. Moreover, the more down-stream a stage is, the less the price 
changes. This result is in line with the price coefficients in the long-run 
relationships of the partially rational price coordination model, see equations 
(4d) and (4e). 
Table 3. Deviation (in %) from the long-run equilibrium value in month -1 as 
ISgnsequence of an impulse in pi (1) 
^
m
^ px p2 _P1 £ i _ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
20 
30 
QO 
6.89* 
7.46* 
8.03* 
8.30* 
8.66* 
9.13* 
10.25* 
10.02* 
10.02* 
10.02* 
2.86* 
3.58* 
4.29* 
4.89* 
5.39* 
5.87* 
6.53* 
6.08* 
6.12* 
6.12* 
1.56* 
1.78* 
2.38* 
2.20* 
3.39* 
3.78* 
4.33* 
4.00* 
4.03* 
4.02* 
-0.29 
-0.24 
0.54* 
0.74* 
1.00* 
1.21* 
1.67* 
1.52* 
1.53* 
1.53* 
I ) Values marked with an t%*" arc significant at the 2.5% level 
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Table 4. Deviation (in %) from the long-run equilibrium value in month -1 as 
a consequence of an impulse in/r> (1) 
month 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
20 
30 
00 
P\ 
0 
0.07 
0.11 
0.01 
-0.28 
-0.67 
-3.10 
-3.41 
-3.33 
-3.34 
Pi 
3.94* 
3.74* 
2.94* 
2.15 
1.26 
0.42 
-2.27 
-2.06 
-2.04 
-2.04 
ft 
2.41* 
2.51* 
2.28* 
1.85* 
1.25 
0.62 
-1.46 
-1.36 
-1.34 
-1.34 
PA 
0.72* 
1.10* 
1.26* 
1.14* 
0.96* 
0.70 
-0.45 
-0.53 
-0.51 
-0.51 
(1) Values marked with an "*" are significant at the 2.5% level. 
Table 5. Deviation (in %) from the long-run equilibrium value in month -1 as 
a consequence of an impulse in/?3 (1) 
month 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
20 
30 
00 
Pi 
0 
2.16* 
3.83* 
4.88* 
4.85* 
4.58* 
4.10 
4.08 
4.09 
4.09 
Pi 
0 
2.06* 
2.87* 
3.30* 
3.10* 
2.83* 
2.47 
2.49 
2.50 
2.50 
Pi 
1.24* 
2.06* 
2.13* 
2.14* 
1.96* 
1.83* 
1.63 
1.64 
1.64 
1.64 
p4 
0.28 
0.17 
0.77* 
0.85* 
0.86* 
0.79* 
0.63 
0.62 
0.63 
0.63 
(1) Values marked with an "*" are significant at the 2.5% level. 
In Tables 4 and 5, however, the impulse to the system does not lead to 
responses that are significant in the long run. Nevertheless, according to 
Table 4, in the short run the impulse in p2 does bring about significant 
changes in the prices of the subsequent stages, but not in pi- Apparently, an 
impulse in the price of fattened pigs has no significant effect on piglet prices. 
Consequently, stage 1 is a bottleneck in case of an impulse inp2- Finally, no 
bottlenecks are found in Table 5, because in the short run all prices show 
significant responses to the impulse inp^. 
In addition to monitoring price bottlenecks, a is tested for zero rows to 
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detect which stage is the price leader. The results are presented in Table 7. 
When using the 10% significance level, it appears that all prices are error-
correcting. Therefore, we tentatively conclude that there is no stage whose 
price is driving the prices of the other stages in the long run, implying that 
there is no stage that can be considered the price leader. 
Table 6. Deviation (in %) from the long-run equilibrium value in month -1 as 
^consequence of an impulse inp4 (1) 
JD25th /?, p2 p3 p4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
20 
30 
QO 
0 
-1.07 
-3.99* 
-4.96* 
-5.74* 
-5.95* 
-6.26* 
-5.92* 
-5.94* 
-5.94* 
0 
-0.40 
-2.81* 
-3.48* 
-3.97* 
-4.10* 
-3.97* 
-3.59* 
-3.63* 
-3.63* 
0 
-0.58 
-1.82* 
-2.13* 
-2.47* 
-2.62* 
-2.65* 
-2.36* 
-2.39* 
-2.39* 
1.85* 
0.08 
0.02 
-0.57* 
-0.79* 
-0.92* 
-1.06* 
-0.90* 
-0.91* 
-0.91* 
0) Values marked with an "*" are significant at the 2.5% level. 
Table 7. Testing for the absence of the error-correction terms in the equations 
££the (non-structural) VECM 
test statistic 
1(3,44) 
P^alue 
APi/ 
2.88 
0.04 
equation of 
Ap2t Apu 
4.73 2.45 
0.01 0.08 
<W 
9.52 
0.00 
S Ccmcluslû ns 
Iri this paper we proposed a method for monitoring bottlenecks in price 
coordination within the chain. We applied our method to analysing price 
ordination in the Dutch pork production-marketing chain. Starting with the 
uPstream one, the following four stages were considered: the breeders (stage 1), 
who produce the piglets; the fatteners (stage 2), who produce the fattened pigs; 
"te slaughterhouses (stage 3), which produce the pork; and lastly, the retailers 
(stage 4), who sell the pork to the consumers. The main conclusions are: 
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• The proposed framework and research methodology seem to be a useful 
instrument for monitoring price bottlenecks in agricultural marketing 
channels, in particular for products that are processed to a minor extent in 
the channel, such as fresh products like pork. 
• In the pork chain there are no structural bottlenecks in price coordination, 
i.e., in the long run the output price in each stage forms an equilibrium 
relationship with each of the output prices of the other stages. 
• None of the stages appear to be the price leader in the sense of driving the 
prices in the other stages in the long run. 
• In the long run, the more downstream a stage is, the less its price differs 
from the equilibrium value that had been reached before a one-time price 
shock occurred in one of the stages of the pork chain. 
• In the short run the price of piglets does not respond to price changes in 
other stages if these price changes are initiated by an impulse in the price 
of fattened pigs. Hence, in case of an impulse in the price of fattened pigs 
the breeders act as bottlenecks in short-run price coordination. 
Our analysis of bottlenecks can be extended along the framework 
proposed in Section 2 by analysing the long-run equilibrium price 
relationships in more detail, by introducing more variables, such as 
competitive prices, and by allowing for more than one firm per stage of the 
marketing channel (see e.g. Choi, 1996, and Wohlgenant, 1989, and the 
references cited therein). All these extensions, however, ask for a further 
elaboration of demand and cost functions. 
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